Heidegger in our century
reflections relative to the publisher’s description for an upcoming book on Heidegger—and 21st century scientific industries?
gary e. davis
According to the publisher’s description, the author (T.A. hereafter) asks “How exactly is technology transforming us and our worlds, and what (if anything) can and should we do about it?” (Since the book isn’t yet published, I’ll make the following about themes from the book description, not reference to T.A.)
Response to that question is a thriving industry, which has evolved far beyond Heidegger’s prospections. Heidegger’s “thought-full and deliberately provocative response is still worth pondering today” (T.A.), but as a matter of intellectual historiology, to me: I wonder what relevance Heidegger can anymore have outside of intellectual history (and conceptual edification). Intellectual history is a fine thing (along with conceptual edification), but maybe not relevant for contemporary challenges of higher education and public policy. Historiology isn’t relevant for appropriating outcomes of contemporary scientific enterprises relative to contemporary human interests. But again, conceptual edification is very important.
For example, A.I. (which is not really intelligent) is developing evolutionary algorithms which have become agentic, i.e., simulating intentional behavior. We must ensure that the humanity of intelligence is progressing in our best ways of orienting action relative to the best values (and—my prevailing interest—relative to how creativity may best flourish). Heidegger’s apt worries for his times have been vastly antedated.
A.I. already passes the Turing test (more or less); yet, being so far beyond human capability for information processing that it’s programmed to simplify (dumb down) its responses as personable conversation. This is engineered duplicity. Backers of the industry want consumers to humanize the interaction, which is easy since we’re primally personifying creatures. But how may we best understand the challenges of securing and advancing our own potential (which Heidegger doesn’t try to prospect) relative to the instrumental power of engineered and desired personification? What is satisfied in grand personification? Is The Singularity now to replace ethnic want of merger with fabulatively prospected perfectability, i.e., “God”?
The literature on A.I. and human interests is still largely influenced by Hubert Dreyfus, who never really understood Heidegger’s interactive orientation. Dreyfus’s critiques focused on relations to objects (as did Husserl, Dreyfus’s real mentor) rather than relations with persons (which was Heidegger’s orientation). Dreyfus was interested in merely the proximal level of Heidegger’s thinking.
T.A.’s book description highlights nuclear technology, genetic engineering, synthetic biology, and A.I. But regarding all of these as instances of something which is the same, i.e., technologicality (so to speak), implies (resurrects) a metaphysicalism which Heidegger rightly deconstructed.
Rightly for a critique of ontologism in technological thinking, one would indeed find notions
of essentialist technologicality to be framed and overcome. But to regard the listing of technologies above in a singular manner (as sharing something essential to them) is a regressive venture. It’s re-ontologizing enterprises which don’t regard themselves in some essentialist way.
For example, a genetic engineer and A.I. designer would likely agree that they depend on mathematized conceptions of information. But biosemiotics has little to do with logic circuits (except at the level of informatics, which isn’t ontologistic). Already, dreams of quantum computing anticipate using light for information transfer in place of solid circuitry. What can we say about anticipated applications? A.I. “AlphaFold” modeling will allow molecular engineering of medicines (and hopefully not bioweapons). That concerns theoretical bioethics and global public health leadership.
Such enterprises must be immanently understood before critique of there being conceptual implicatures can “be” useful. (A conception of science which doesn’t distinguish theoretical modeling, hypothesis testing, and translation research into enterprises which have manifold implicatures [political, social, cultural, professional, cultural and conceptual] can’t be very useful for progressive practices.)
In other words, regarding very different enterprises under a conception of technologization is likely a regressive effort to create relevance for mid-20th century thinking which is really only part of the intellectual histories of very different scientific enterprises and conceals their own special issues: scientific, cultural, social, and political. There is no singularity of historicality (implying Originism) in bushy evolving (our conceptual gardening). Critique of technologization (in a Heideggerian spirit) did indeed frame very-present essentialist homogenization. But that offered no guidance on advancing and appropriating the special enterprises for the sake of human interests. Critique provides no insight for going forward validly unless it emerged immanently in the first place.
What’s to be done with emerging enterprises, such as molecular engineering, quantum computing, and the agentic potential of A.I.’s planetary residence, relative to increasingly oligarchic interests which are ignoring issues of species sustainability? Near-term capital formation has no interest in long-termism, though there’s plenty of wealth in the world to solve all problems of sustainability, climate risks, and making collaborative global leadership work, if only there was not so much wealth controlled by private estates (tax-evasion regimes).
Though honoring Heidegger’s anticipations of planetary thinking mid-century is admirable,
his preliminary prospecting has been antedated by Gaic conceptions of hothouse Earth. The unprecedented character of our evolving technologies can evince a “constellation of intelligibility” (T.A.), but the evolutionary character of technological emergences is post-ontologistic. And professional philosophy now thinks best in terms of evolving of conceptuality relative to contemporary scientific enterpreises.
The appeal of technological power easily shows onto-theological background. But that provides no insight into how to better, even best, understand contemporary enterprises. Indeed, “technology [may express] an historical mode of ontological disclosure” (T.A.), but we must create new ways of thinking, which Heidegger prospected relative to our poential for futural inceptions which he could not anticipate.
But he was an original conceptual analyst, striving to have persons think about technology through a conceptuality which is post-metaphysicalist and pragmatically figurative about our open potential for humanity (exemplified by poetic thinking).
I noted last week that “…when Heidegger was working, there wasn’t yet an emancipa-
tory conception of developmental psychology, ordinary language analysis, positive psychology, critical phenomenology, literary postmodernism, and relational psychodynamic psychotherapy. But his “ways not works” prospected all of that (unwittingly) as a holistic conception of teaching—emancipatory and educive (enabling)—in his enowning of post-metaphysicalist conceptuality shared through tropical discourse.” (“on a way to original thinking”).
Heidegger prospects how we may best interact, modeled through hermeneutical paradigms of textual dwelling. Relative to scientific enterprises, that should importantly contribute to ensuring that our reserved standing (our humanity) prevails over the “standing reserve” of technical means.
The “worlding” of things (Heidegger, “The Thing,” Poetry, Language, Thought) is basically about our valuable interacting relative to emergent events and appreciation of phenomena aptly.
Make (and let) things mirror our caring together, our belonging to each other in shared humanity, granted (letting be) and borne (made good): there being, there being time for shared caring.
The philosophical heritage isn’t basically important for our unprecedented challenge to design our humane futures. Historicism conceals the futural nature of there being our evolving presence. Heidegger insisted that philosophy in a new key must be formed relative to our unprecedented planetary situations, not oriented by excavations of history (so treasured by intellectual historians who are apparently threatened by Heidegger’s deconstructions of onto-theological pretenses, which are truly characteristic of intellectual historiology, that child of History of Ideas’ longing for another Hegel).
If Heidegger was alive, he would look to the worlding of the world now, not invite mid-20th century prospecting for our challenges of designing futures. That’s a calling for philosophy to rethink its potential for orientation by its times.
Humanity is living in perpetual future shock. We need to make genuinely valuable direction for that relative to constructive appreciation of futural being now, oriented by sacred desire to be good ancestors (“acting locally”) of thinking globally.
Several hours later became several days later
Several hours after my initial venture here, I wanted to avoid redundancy and better clarify free-associative theming which was mixed with ambivalence about Heidegger’s relevance anymore, because regarding his critiques of technology as regressive is above still advocating his conceptual creativity.
So it goes with being a philosophical son long into my own way of working, thanks to his influence.
I did substantial revision, but separate themes deserve more attention (always the case), and I overread a publisher’s blurb.
But I’ll let the above stay as it is. It was and is a break from an unrelated project.
A writer drafts to get ideas initially articulated. That’s likely an ambivalence about what’s sketched. But if I suddenly died prior to adding these comments several hours after the first draft, a reader would likely presume that I believed it all as stated, rather than as sketch. But there can be writerly value to keeping initial sketches, like journaling which is always provisional. And there’s reason for a writer to preserve notes that s/he has left behind on their path, preserved for the sake of a record of one’s developing project.
Such is also the spirit of phenomenological work.
Such is the spirit in which scholars of Heidegger should read his notebooks, which are so full of frame-quoted phrasing about what They say, worthy of consideration for formulating critique or otherwise: Some years ago, I dwelled with Heidegger’s late-life interest in technology relative to recently living through his Contributions to Philosophy and Ted Kisiel’s late-life interest in Heidegger’s notion of “Ge-Stell” (afer several opening paragraphs which are prospective): “originary flow, conceptual design, and concerted cultivation.”
An overview of what I’m primarily doing with Heidegger’s thinking is “being”